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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen the Internet become a key vehicle for
citizens around the globe to express political opinions and
organize protests. This fact has not gone unnoticed, with
countries around the world repurposing network manage-
ment tools (e.g., URL ltering products) and protocols (e.g.,
BGP, DNS) for censorship. However, repurposing these prod-
ucts can have unintended international impact, which we
refer to as “censorship leakage”. While there have been anec-
dotal reports of censorship leakage, there has yet to be a
systematic study of censorship leakage at a global scale.
In this paper, we combine a global censorship measure-
ment platform (ICLab) with a general-purpose technique
– boolean network tomography – to identify which AS on
a network path is performing censorship. At a high-level,
our approach exploits BGP churn to narrow down the set of
potential censoring ASes by over 95%. We exactly identify
65 censoring ASes and nd that the anomalies introduced
by 24 of the 65 censoring ASes have an impact on users lo-
cated in regions outside the jurisdiction of the censoring AS,
resulting in the leaking of regional censorship policies.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is now regarded as part of the critical infras-
tructure, with citizens relying on it for dissemination of
information and organizing political action. Consequently,
governments and network-level entities – e.g., Autonomous
Systems (ASes) – are implementing forms of censorship to
restrict access to specic content, in many cases, repurpos-
ing existing network management tools [10] and protocols
(e.g., DNS [1, 22], BGP [4]) to lter Internet content. The past
decade has seen numerous instances, where this repurposing
of protocols has had unintended international impact, which
we refer to as “censorship leakage.” These have included the
2008 hijack of YouTube trac by Pakistan Telecom [4], and
cases of DNS root-servers located in China impacting inter-
national users [3]. While specic instances of censorship
leakage have been a boon for researchers (in particular those
studying China) [1, 9, 22, 34, 36], we lack a broader under-
standing of the prevalence of this phenomenon. Part of the
challenge of understanding censorship leakage on a global
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scale is developing a technique that is able to identify censor-
ship leakage in general vs. looking for specic instances (e.g.,
injected RST or DNS packets from China [1, 34]). This chal-
lenge is compounded by a general lack of vantage points that
are available for measuring censorship on an ongoing basis.
We address these challenges by combining the ICLab mea-
surement platform with the idea of boolean network tomog-
raphy [33]. ICLab is a platform of ∼1,000 globally distributed
vantage point that has been performing measurements of
censorship on an ongoing basis since November 2015 (more
details in §2.1).
Our intuition is that we can observe multiple tests from a
given vantage point to a given destination and that, if there
is sucient path churn between the vantage point and des-
tination, we can create a set of boolean constraints where
the constraint is true if censorship is observed, and false
otherwise. In the case where censorship is observed, it must
be the case that at least one autonomous system (AS) on
the path is performing censorship. We can then input these
constraints into an o-the-shelf SAT solver to identify the
AS performing censorship. In this study, we demonstrate the
applicability of this intuition by answering the following key
questions: (1) Is there enough path churn observed in our
measurements to create a solvable set of constraints? We
need to validate that we have enough variability in paths,
especially in the cases where we observe censorship, to cre-
ate a solvable set of constraints to narrow down the set of
potential censors. (2) Will our constraints generate a small
set of potential censoring ASes? We want to make sure that
the set of potential censoring ASes is not intractably large,
making it impossible to exactly identify ASes responsible for
implementing censorship. While answering these questions,
we make the following contributions:
Problem reformulation. We demonstrate how measure-
ments gathered by the ICLab platform can be used to for-
mulate a boolean network tomography problem solvable
by o-the-shelf SAT solvers. Our approach carries over to
other measurement databases such as those generated by
the OONI [16] and the M-Lab [23] platforms.
Measuring and exploiting network-level churn. We
show that the instability of network-level paths can act as a
substitute for strategically placed internal monitors. Specif-
ically, we show that 25%, 30%, 28%, and 67% of paths be-
tween ICLab vantage points and web servers are observed
to change over periods of one day, week, month, and year.
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These changes are found to signicantly improve the solv-
ability of our constructed SAT problems.
Identifying censors and censorship leakage. We empir-
ically demonstrate that our approach allows us to reduce
the size of the set of potential censoring ASes by over 95%,
on average. Further, we exactly identify 65 censoring ASes
located in 30 dierent countries. Our study also identies
leakage of censorship policies – i.e., cases where censoring
ASes blocked access to content even for users outside their
country of operation. Specically, we nd that 32 and 24
of the censoring ASes leak censorship to other ASes and
countries, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
Censorship measurement. Much of previous work has
focused on understanding how censorship is performed by
network-level entities. Studies have shown that censors may
restrict access to content by injecting incorrect DNS replies
[1, 26], sending TCP reset packets spuriously [2, 21], using
o-the-shelf ltering and blocking tools [11], or throttling
connections to censored content [2]. Our study builds o
of related work on large-scale longitudinal censorship mea-
surement systems. Specically, we use data collected by the
ICLab platform [29] to detect censorship and generate con-
straints. Conceptually, our techniques could be applied to
other platforms such as OONI [16] as well.
Fault localization. Other studies have approached the
problem of network failure localization with dierent per-
spectives. Lifeguard [20] relies on historical control-plane
measurements and active probing to automatically identify
and route around network failures via crafted BGP messages.
Feamster et al.[13] measure the eectiveness of reactive rout-
ing around node failures. Their approach localizes failures
in real-time by analyzing results of active probes, including
pings and traceroutes, between vantage points. While other
work in the area has focused on identifying the root cause
of path changes on the Internet [14, 18, 28, 31, 35], we focus
on localizing faults and errors that do trigger path changes.
Boolean network tomography. Network tomography
[33] typically involves using end-to-end measurements and
a set of monitors within the network to uncover hidden node
values (which in the case of boolean network tomography,
may only take the values True or False). Monitors are used
to ensure that appropriate end-to-end measurements may be
performed to unveil specic node characteristics. We use the
data gathered by the ICLab platform as end-to-end measure-
ments from which we identify nodes (ASes) implementing
specic types of censorship. Unlike typical boolean network
tomography problems, our study is limited by the absence of
strategically located monitors from which end-to-end mea-
surements can be gathered. However, we show that due to
the churn of network-level paths, we are still able to use
boolean network tomography to identify censoring ASes.
Several studies have focused on the problem of error local-
ization through boolean network tomography. Ma et al.[24]
focus on identifying the conditions, monitor locations, and
probing mechanisms that are necessary for fault localization
through boolean network tomography. Dhamdhere et al.[12]
use a boolean network tomography approach in conjunction
with “troubleshooting sensors” (monitors) located within the
network to identify miscongured routers responsible for
network failures. Other work has applied boolean network
tomography to identify areas of heavy congestion [32] and
packet loss [7, 8]. In this paper, we use boolean network
tomography combined with the network-level path churn
in routing protocols (as a substitute for specic monitors) to
identify ASes that introduce censorship related anomalies.
2.1 The ICLab Dataset
We rely on data gathered by the ICLab censorship measure-
ment platform [29] as a source for end-to-end measurements.
The ICLab platform repetitively performs a variety of mea-
surements between a set of over 1K globally distributed van-
tage points and web-servers hosting regionally sensitive
content. The platform aims to (1) identify content being cen-
sored, (2) understand how censorship is implemented, and
(3) record changes in censorship policies over time. Speci-
cally, ICLab identies the following anomalies as indicative
of potential censorship:
DNS anomalies. DNS anomalies occur when a censor in-
jects DNS responses to queries issued by a client. The idea
being that if the censor is closer to the client, their injected
packet will arrive at the client before the response from the
DNS resolver. DNS injection can be detected by observing
two response packets for the same DNS request. The ICLab
platform identies DNS injection by making DNS queries for
domain names using both, Google’s DNS resolver (8.8.8.8)
and the default resolver of the vantage point, and then ob-
serving the number of response packets received, in each
case. If a second DNS response packet is received within two
seconds of the rst, an anomaly is reported.
SEQNO and TTL anomalies. A packet injector will often
have attributes that dier from the legitimate server for a
connection. ICLab platform issues HTTP GET requests and
records all responses (while following redirects). The plat-
form then analyzes raw packet captures to identify anomalies.
Specically, we compare the IP TTL header on the SYNACK
packet of the connection with subsequent packets. This relies
on the assumption that a censor will not be fast enough to
act prior to the SYNACK being sent by the server. Further,
injected packets will often not be able to perfectly mimic the
TCP state of the server [34]. We look for cases where there
are overlapping sequence numbers between packets or gaps
in sequence numbers. These sequence number anomalies, es-
pecially when combined with packets having the RST ag set
(to close the connection) are likely indicators of censorship.
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Period 2016-05 ∼ 2017-05
Unique URLs 774
AS Vantage Points 539
Destination ASes 620
Countries 219
Measurements 4.9M
– w/DNS anomalies 2.3K (0.05%)
– w/SEQNO anomalies 9.8K (0.20%)
– w/TTL anomalies 17K (0.35%)
– w/RESET anomalies 8.4K (0.17%)
– w/Blockpages 1.5K (0.03%)
Table 1: ICLab dataset characteristics.
Block pages. Finally, the platform analyzes the responses
received to identify blockpages that are returned by a cen-
sor. This is done by performing regular expression matching
with known examples of blockpages (provided by the OONI
project [27]) and by comparing responses with those ob-
tained from censor-free vantage points within the United
States. In the latter case, we employ techniques developed
by Jones et al. to identify block pages [19]
Network paths. In addition to gathering the above data,
the platform also records traceroutes from vantage points to
the corresponding destinations of each test.
In total, we utilize 4.9M measurements (with 39K total
identied anomalies) from the platform between vantage
points located in 539 dierent ASes (in 219 countries) and
774 URLs. A summary of the ICLab data that we use in our
work is summarized in Table 1.
Ethical considerations and limitations. To mitigate risk,
the vast majority of ICLab’s vantage points are obtained via
commercial VPN providers (many of which are located in
ASes classied as content ASes by CAIDA[5]). This allows
us to obtain widespread continuous measurements, without
putting users in specic regions at risk. A potential limitation
of this decision, is the inability to observe the same ltering
as ASes providing residential connections.
In collaboration with the Citizen Lab, we have worked to
deploy a handful of Raspberry Pi nodes running the measure-
ment software. Prior to deploying a node, we discuss with
the volunteer about the potential risks and they are further
presented with a form that summarizes risks for their given
country based on existing metrics (e.g., Freedom House [17]).
Since the platform does not collect personally identiable in-
formation, our IRB has determined that this project does not
constitute human subjects research. Regardless, we maintain
contact with any volunteers and monitor the political situa-
tions in dierent regions. Some regions have been deemed
too risky to operate in (e.g., Iran, Syria). In general, we aim
to balance risk with potential benets of the measurements.
3 LOCALIZING CENSORS
At a high-level, our approach works as follows: First, we
use the traceroutes gathered by the ICLab platform to con-
struct boolean clauses such that the literals in the clauses
represent ASes observed in the traceroute. We then use the
censorship measurements associated with the corresponding
traceroutes to assign truth values to the clauses. Finally, the
clauses are converted to Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF)
and used as input to an o-the-shelf SAT solver. The process
is repeated for each type of censorship measurement (i.e.,
DNS injection, HTTP tampering, and blockpage detection)
and various time slices (i.e., for all measurements performed
during the same day, week, and month). Next, we analyze
the solutions returned by the SAT solver for each CNF. In
cases where there are multiple solutions – i.e., multiple truth
assignments for a given CNF formulation – we return all
literals (ASes) having True assignments as potential censors.
In cases where there is a single solution, we return all literals
(ASes) having True assignments as censors. Finally, we char-
acterize censorship leakage by identifying ASes that observe
censorship only when they transit through censoring ASes.
3.1 Constructing a SATisliability problem
Each record in the ICLab dataset contains: (1) the vantage
point AS, (2) the URL being tested, (3) the anomaly being
tested (and whether it was detected or not), (4) three tracer-
outes between the vantage point and the URL at the time
of testing, and (5) the time at which the test was performed.
We use each of these records to create boolean satisability
problems as follows:
Clause formulation. First, we use historical IP-to-AS map-
ping from CAIDA [6] to convert the IP-level traceroutes to
AS-level paths. Next, we eliminate cases with inconclusive
paths – i.e., cases where one of the following situations oc-
curred: (1) IP-to-AS mapping was not possible for any of
the IPs observed in the traceroute, (2) traceroutes were not
possible due to errors, (3) AS-inference was not possible due
to non-responsive hops and dierent ASes observed in the
previous and subsequent responsive hop, and (4) there was
more than one AS-level path obtained after conversion of
the three traceroutes. Each of the remaining AS-level paths
forms a clause in our SAT formulation, with each observed
AS acting as a literal. The truth value attached to the clause
is True if the measurement detected its corresponding anom-
aly, and False otherwise. For example, if the AS-level path
X → Y → Z observed DNS censorship, it is represented by
the clause (XDNS ∨ YDNS ∨ ZDNS ) = T .
Time- andURL-based splitting. Our formulation accounts
for the fact that censorship policies and techniques may
change over time (e.g., Iran is known to increase censor-
ship during political events such as elections [2]). Not doing
so introduces the possibility of generating an unsolvable
CNF in the event of a policy change – e.g., the measure-
ment (XDNS ∨ YDNS ∨ ZDNS ) = T is observed on Day 1
and (XDNS ∨ YDNS ∨ ZDNS ) = F on Day 2. We address this
problem by creating CNFs at four time granularities – days,
weeks, months, and year. Additionally, since not all URLs
being tested are subject to censorship, we further restrict the
CNFs to only include clauses containing measurements to
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a single URL. Therefore, we generate one CNF per URL per
time granularity (day, week, month, and year). Finally, each
CNF is solved using and o-the-shelf SAT solver.
3.2 Analyzing SAT solutions
Given a CNF, a SAT solver may return no solution, a single
solution, or multiple solutions. When no solution is returned,
there is no possible truth assignment to ASes that can satisfy
the input CNF. These scenarios may arise due to (1) noise in
the ICLab measurements – i.e., incorrect anomaly detection
or path inference or (2) changing censorship policies within
the specied time granularity. A single solution implies the
presence of exactly one satisfying truth assignment to ASes.
This ideal scenario allows us to exactly identify ASes that are
responsible for generating the measured censorship related
anomalies (i.e., the ASes that are assigned a True value in
the solution). We label these ASes as censoring ASes. Finally,
when the CNF does not contain enough clauses to generate
a single solution, multiple satisfying assignments may be
possible. When this situation arises, we consider every AS
as a potential censor unless the literal associated with it is
assigned a False value in all returned solutions.
3.3 Identifying censorship leakage
In order to prevent leakage of censorship (i.e., where regional
censorship policies impact users outside the region), censor-
ship policies need to be implemented in ASes that are either
stubs or provide transit services only for ASes within the
region. To uncover instances of censorship leakage, we use
the following approach: First, we only consider all AS-level
paths used in CNFs that return exactly one solution. Next,
we identify ASes that (1) are assigned a False truth value
in the returned solution, (2) are located upstream from the
identied censors (i.e., closer to the vantage point being used
by ICLab), and (3) are located in a dierent country from the
censoring ASes in the CNF. We label these ASes as victims
of censorship leakage due to their inheritance of censorship
from censoring ASes in other countries. This inheritance
occurs due to their trac transiting through censoring ASes.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We focus on measuring (1) how often our approach is able
to generate solvable SAT instances, (2) the amount of path
churn observed and its impact on our SAT instance solv-
ability, and (3) the ASes responsible for implementing and
leaking censorship.
Satisability of generated CNFs. As discussed earlier, the
CNFs generated by our approach may return (1) no solutions
– indicative of changing censorship policies or noise in ICLab
measurements, (2) exactly one solution – the ideal scenario,
or (3) many solutions – indicative of insucient number of
measurements through diverse paths. In order to understand
which scenario occurs most frequently, we analyze the re-
sults returned by our SAT solver for CNFs of dierent time
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Figure 1: Number of solutions found for constructed
CNFs when split by CNF granularity and anomaly.
granularities and anomaly types. We nd that on average,
nearly 92% of our CNFs return exactly one solution and less
than 6% of our CNFs return no solution. This indicates high
delity in our underlying data and highlights our ability to
exactly identify censoring ASes.
Our results, when considering CNFs generated for dif-
ferent time granularities and anomalies, are illustrated in
Figure 1. Figure 1a shows that as our CNF granularity be-
comes coarser, its solvability reduces. This is expected since
(1) censorship policies are more likely to change and (2) we
are more likely to include a noisy measurement in our CNF
form when considering larger time periods. Figure 1b shows
that nearly 30% of the CNFs generated to identify ASes per-
forming RST injection are unsolvable. This is indicative of
low delity RST injection measurements from the ICLab plat-
form, due to the diculty of dierentiating between organic
and injected RST packets.
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Figure 2: CDF of reduction in number of potential cen-
sors in CNFs with 2+ solutions.
Even if the CNFs generated by our approach yield more
than one solution, they can be useful to identify ASes that
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could not have been responsible for implementing censorship
– i.e., ASes that were assigned a False truth value in every
solution. We further investigate the 3% of scenarios where
constructed CNFs yield more than one solution to identify
the impact of this reduction. We nd that in 20% of such
cases, the solutions satisfying the CNF do not allow for any
elimination of ASes as censors – i.e., we are unable to narrow
down the set of possible censors by eliminating denite non-
censors. However, on average, 95.2% of all ASes in a CNF are
identied as denite non-censors, leaving only 4.8% of the
observed ASes as potential censoring ASes. Figure 2 shows
that 50% of all generated CNFs with multiple solutions have
nearly 90% of their ASes eliminated as potential censors.
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Figure 3: Number of distinct paths observed between a
source and destination AS over varying time periods.
Impact of path churn. Now, we measure the amount of
network-level path churn observed over the course of our
measurements and consider the impact it has on the us-
ability of our approach. In order to measure the amount
of network-level path churn, we measure the number of
distinct network-level paths observed between each source
(ICLab vantage point) and destination URL for each day,
week, month, and year. Figure 3 shows the fraction of these
(source, destination) pairs that observe path changes over
varying time periods. We nd that nearly 25% of all pairs
observe path changes within a single day. This fraction in-
creases to 30%, 38%, and 67% when considering periods of
one week, month, and year, respectively. Over the period of
one year, 35% of the measured pairs recorded at least ve
distinct network-level paths. Using CAIDA’s AS classica-
tion database [5], we found no signicant dierences in the
amount of churn observed when considering specic classes
of destination ASes (content, enterprise, or transit AS).
To understand the impact of network-level path churn on
the eectiveness of our approach, we analyze the solvabil-
ity of CNFs constructed in the absence of path churn. We
eliminate the impact of path churn by only considering the
measurements using the rst observed distinct path between
a source and destination in each CNF. Figure 4 illustrates
the number of solutions returned by such CNFs. We see
that nearly 80% of all CNFs return ve or more solutions
(compared to < 1% in the case of CNFs that include multi-
ple distinct paths). We nd that although less than 25% of
all paths are impacted by path churn each day, the impact
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Figure 4: Number of solutions returned by CNFs in the
absence of network-level path churn.
of these path changes on the solvability of the constructed
CNFs is signicant.
Uncovering censors and censorship leakage. We now
analyze the censoring ASes identied by our approach. In
total, we identify 65 censoring ASes located in 30 dierent
countries. The countries with the most number of censoring
ASes are reported in Table 2. In our analysis we observe a few
regions implementing a wide array of censorship approaches.
In particular, we nd that censors in China and Cyprus im-
plement all measured forms of censorship. Further, the ASes
AS1299 (Telianet, Sweden), AS59564 (UNIT-IS, Ukraine), and
AS8966 (Etisalat, UAE) are all found to implement at least
four of the ve measured censorship approaches. Using the
McAfee URL categorization database [25], we nd that URLs
that are most commonly censored fall in the Online Shop-
ping and Classieds categories. Further analysis reveals that
most ASes perform censorship exclusively on few categories
of sites, with the exception of ASes in Cyprus which censor
content across many dierent categories. Interestingly, we
also identify several ASes (located in Ireland, Spain, and the
United Kingdom) which exclusively censor URLs associated
with popular ad vendors.
Region Censoring ASes Anomalies
China AS4132, AS4812, AS4837,
AS17621, AS37963, AS58461
All
United Kingdom AS5413, AS8928, AS9009,
AS20860, AS35017, AS42831
Block, TTL
Singapore AS4657, AS7473, AS17547,
AS38001
SEQ, TTL
Poland AS20853, AS31621, AS42656 Block, DNS, SEQ
Cyprus AS8544, AS35432, AS197648 All
Table 2: Regions withmost number of censoring ASes.
To identify which of these 65 censoring ASes leak censor-
ship, we record the regions for which they provide upstream
transit (§3.3). We nd a total of 32 censoring ASes leak their
censorship policies to other ASes. Of these, 24 have censor-
ship leakage extending to other countries. Table 3 lists the
ASes responsible for the largest number of leaks outside their
region. We nd six Chinese ASes in the Top 10, with four
other ASes from Poland, Japan, Russia, and the UAE complet-
ing the list. Figure 5 illustrates the countries most impacted
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Figure 5: Flow of censorship. Darker countries contain
more censoring ASes and thicker lines indicate more
leakage. Sources of leakage are marked with a point.
by censorship leakage and those containing censoring ASes.
We see that with the exception of China, most other leakage
is regional – e.g., European and middle-eastern censors leak
censorship mostly to other countries in the same region.
AS Region Leaks
(AS)
Leaks
(Country)
AS58461 Hangzhou-IDC China 49 21
AS37963 Alibaba-CN China 36 19
AS31621 QXL-NET Poland 28 13
AS4812 Chinanet-SH China 16 9
AS4134 Chinanet-Backbone China 12 8
Table 3: Censoring ASes with the largest number of
censorship leaks in terms of ASes and countries.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we leveraged boolean network tomography and
censorship measurements obtained from the ICLab censor-
ship measurement platform to identify the ASes responsible
for inducing censorship related anomalies on the Internet.
Our results show that even in the absence of strategically
selected monitors and vantage points, exact identication of
censoring ASes is possible due to network-level path churn.
Our approach uncovered 65 censoring ASes located in (30 dif-
ferent countries) of which 24 were found to leak censorship
into other countries. In cases where exact identication of
censors was not possible, we were able to reduce the number
of potential censoring ASes by over 95%.
The results obtained in this work also uncover the need to
improve the delity of the RST anomaly detection technique
used by ICLab and traceroutes gathered by the platform. In
addition to improving the robustness of ICLab measurements
(e.g., by using tools such as InTrace [30] in conjunction with
standard traceroutes), we also plan to use our approach to ex-
tend the ICLab censorship measurement platform in several
ways. Specically, we plan to (1) incorporate data obtained
from external performance measurement datasets (e.g., data
from M-Lab [23]) to identify ASes responsible for throttling
the bandwidth made available to specic protocols used for
censorship circumvention and (2) identify, at scale, the ASes
responsible for blocking access to Tor bridges [15].
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